REGULATORS' RESPONSE TO THe CURRENT CRISIS AND
THE UPCOMING REREGULATION OF FlNANClAL
IvJARKETS: ONE RELUCTANT REGULATOR'S VIEW
LUCA El'\RIQUEs·

1.

[NTRODUCTLON

Jn this short Article, I sketch out a few thoughts on securities
regulators' response to the financial crisis of 2007-09 and on the
upcoming process of financial markets reregulation,

from the

unconu110n perspective of a moderately free markcl-leaning legal
scholar

who

was

appointed

as

cornmissioner

of

the

Italian

securities regulator just before the crisis erupted.
First, 1 show how a financial crisis like the one we have recently
experienced requires regulators to beco.me active and appear to be
"doing something," no n1atter whether ''something'' will even help
markets, given the extreme nature of tl1c circumstances. Second, 1
ask whether such a knee-jerk, public relations-rninded kind of
response is inevitable or whether better corporate governance and
accountability arrangements could improve the way regulators
work and react to crises. Finally, I reflect upon the upcoming wave
of reregulation, highlighting its perils and the most likely mistakes
to come, concluding that, leaving aside the necessary overhaul of
bartking regulation, maintaining a pretence of doing something
while actually innovating very little may in fact be the best course
of action for policymakers who care about the effectiveness of
financial market regulation in the long run.

2.

\tVHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH,

Crises are a test for a1L

... EVERYONE GETS GOlNG

A systen1ic crisis like the one of

2008

has been a test for all institutions, both private and public. Among
public institutions, the gravity of the situation pul those with the
University of Bologna, Emopean Corporate Governance Institute and
Commiss.ione Nazionale per le Societa e Ia 13ors<J (''Consob"). Opinions are
exclusively the author's and of course do not necessarily retlect those of Consob. l
am grateful to Marcello Bianchi for helpful cornmenls on an earlier draft a nd to
Matteo Gargantini for his excellent research ,1ssistnnce.
·
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adequate ammunitions-i.e., central lx1nk s and governments-a t
the forefront.
fn

a

se vere financial

crisis such as the current one, while

(securities) regu lator s can do little to chan ge the course of events,
they still cannot si1nply stay idle: they have to do so1nething, for at
least two reasons. First as conventional wisdom has it, if there i s a
crisis, t'h e n regul ator s must have previously failed to do

their job
by omitting to take action, whether regulatory or supervisory, that
could hav e prevented it. Thus, furthe.r inaction, however jus tified
in theory, is intolerable in the middle of a crisis. Second, in such a
grave sitLtation, a diffused sense of urgency implies that everyone
is expected to do his or her part to av er t the meltdown, and it
would be e mbmr C� ssing for any institution to confess that there js
doubts about whether such an
nothing it c;:m do to help:
ins titution is even n ecessary in normal times would spread, and a
negative political spiral for that insbtution, similar to the negative
n'lc'Hket spira ls we have observed for investment and conu11ercial
banks from Bear Stearns on, would ensue.
Thus, in response to the 2007-08 crash, regul a tors had to act,
regardless of how littl e control they had over the situation. Their
reaction, in the form of broad, temporary bans on short sales under
the leadership of the BrHish Financial Services A uthority ("FSA")
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC''), was
the m o st important contribution to crisis management that an y
securitie s regulato rs gave.
Economists have plenty of data to analyze in order to evaluate.
the bans' impact on the markets. Even if the e mpi rical evidence
tells us that the bans had no positive imp act and that in fac l they
had a negative one, r educ ing liqui d j ty and increasing vol a tility as
econonuc intuition would suggest, 1 there still would be a politicnl

1 Some early studies are already showing this.
See MATIHEW CLIFTON &
MARK SNAPE, THE EFFECT OF 51-TORT-SELLING RESTRICTIONS ON LIQUfDITY: EVIDENCE
FROM THE LONDON" STOCK EXCIIANGE 3 (London Stock Exchange 2008)1
http:/jwww.londonstockexchange.comjNR/rdonlyres/5EDD66EF-B589-497495B1-73C51F1C9DFC/O/ShortsellingRestrictionsandMarketQualityDecember2008
.pdf (showing that after the FSA's decision to ban short-selling the bid-ask spread
for banned stocks increased significantly, while a decline was observed in depth,
trades, volume and turnover); [AN W. MARSH & NORMAN NIHvlEl{, THE [MPACT OF
SHoRr St\1 ES RESTTHCTJONS, 11 (2008) (independent study commissioned by the
fntem<ltional Securities Lending Association, the Alternative Investment
Management Association, and the London Investment Banking Association),
http:/jvvww.cass.ci tv .ac.uk/media/stories/reson rces/the-i_mpact-of-short-sales
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justification for the ban. Given that doing nothing in the face of the
crisis was r'IOt an option for political reasons, lhc decision to ban
short sales, however disputable from a technical viewpoint, might
well have been the best course of action for securities regulators to
take:

a ban on short sales like those devi ·ed by securities

regulators around the globe is not only very 1!115.tf to sell to public
opinion as something both intuitively right and sufficiently bold,
but also hard
orders

can

to enforce
come

in an interconnected world in which trade
from

any

jur is dic tion

i.nlcrmediaries.2 And last but not least, the bc:�n

via
was

chains

of

fel!lpomry. By

enacting it, regulators effectively solved the trade-off between
politica I expediency and the need to preserve well·functioning
markets. Other alternatives would have been either ineffective (in
terms of public opinion's perception, think, for inslt:�nce, about the
idea of reviving the ''uptick rule," which sounds like a technicality)
or even more disruptive (think about a resolution shutting down
markets altogether, as the Russian federal agency for securities
markets did twice in October
The

2008).3

crisis has brought to the

surface something that is

inevitably true of (securities) regulators in normal times as well:
political expediency is always of great concern regarding their
actions (and inactions), no matter how formally independent and
well-reputed regulators are.

Rather than a concern for political

expediency, we can more neutrally call it a concern for their irnage

-rcstrictions.pdf (showing that there is no s trong evidem:e that sl,ort-selling
restrictions changed stock behaviour either in the U.K. or in oU1er countrit's).
2 In theory, one could counter that this justification only holds if we take the
presence or a separate securities regulator as a given. With a sing le financial
r�gulcltor in charge, there would be other measures it could take to "do
something," rnaking a ban on short sates unnecessary. It is a fact, however, that
the first regulator to ban short sales on financial stocks, il (ev.r hours before the
U.S. SEC on lhe same day, was a single regulator: the U.K. FSA.
3 The uptick rule provided that, with limited exceptions, a listed security
might be sold short either at a price above the price at which lhe immediately
preceding sale was effected (plus tick), or at the last sale price ii il is higher than
the last different price (zero-plus tick). The rule was repealed by the SEC on July
6, 2007. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation SHO and Rule lOa1, Release No. 34-55970, 17 C.F.R pts. 240, 242 (Jul. 3, 1007), avni/n/1/e at
http:/jwww.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55970.pdf (defining the uplick and
zero-plus lick rules). Since then, several voices have called for the rule to be
restored: see, e.g., Charles R Schwab, Restore the Urtick Rule, Rrsfor�t Confidence,
WALL ST.)., Dt'c. 9, 2008, at 17. On Russian regulators' decisions to shut down
markets in October 2008, see, e.g., Charles Clover, et al., R11::sim7 Trodi11g l-in/led
n{ir'r Plttnge, FIN. TlMES (London), Nov.13, 2008. at 33.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.

L15l1
in

c1

[Vol. 30:-l

]. lnt'f L.

world dorninated by mass media.

In fact, good financial

regL!lators are those who are able to put substance over form. But

tend to be smart enough to
understand that they should put image o,·cr substance, if they
want to thrive. And that, in general, can cause p ro blem s.
Concern about public opinion easily distorts the way regu!l1tors
perform their functions; si mila rly according to some, short
terrnisrTl (an excessive concern for financial B na lysts qu.1: rtcrly

good

financial

regulators

also

,

'

evaluations of a company's prospects) can dislorl

rnnnagerial

choices. In the p rivate sector, corporate governance rnechanisms
whether the result of private ordering or of IC�wrnakers' efforts
curb the effects of such distortions and of agency problems more
gener-.llly. Much less e p1or ed than with regard to corporations is
the qul'Stion of what governance mechanisms can similarly ensure
that governmental organizations' agents pursue their institutions'
objectives or, in other words, cater to the inter sts of their
principe1ls (the general public).

SimiJarly, there is less debate on

whether all steps have been taken by individual jurisdictions to
have the best possible regulators' governance mechanisms in place.
From this perspective, it is interesting to note that the two
jurisdictions currentty hosting the largest financial markets have
sulved financial (securities) regulators' governance probl ems very
diffcrenlly.
On one hand, the U.S. SEC is a paradigmatic exan1ple of a
supervisory agency relying aln1ost exclusively on political control
mechanisms. The four main formal governance mechanisms are: (1)
appointment rights (jn the hands of the President and the Senate);
(2) what is known in the venture capital literature as staged

financing (the annual approval of the SECs budget by the U.S.
Congress);

(3)

a public sector gate keeping function in the form of

an audit by the Govenm1ent Accountability Office ("GAO"); and
(4) transparency, in the form for instance of the gen eral rules of the

Sunshine Act under which the Com1nission's meetings arc open to
the public unless secrecy is necessary to protect a general interest:'
On the oth er hand, the U.K. FSA relies on political control
mechanisms no more (and on p ap er less) than on internal
governance n1echanisn1s, mimicking those commonly adopted by

/\n important nzfomwl feature of the SEC governance is the revolving door
system: n·u1ny SEC employees htlve previously <1nd subsequently served in law
firms or finilncic1l institutions, usually working at the SEC for just fl few yeMs.
I
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publicly traded corporations.::;

Not only is

the

1151

FSA formally

incorporated as a private company limited by guarantee but,
according to law, it also has to comply with the
best governance practices (to the extent
with the FSA's tetsks).

that

generally

accepted

these are consistent

number of principles of the U.K.

A

Combined Code of Corporate Governance are thus embodied in
the law governing the FSA:

for exan1ple, the

board members are non-executive

n1ajority of the FSA
directors (often rnaintaining

their previous employment) and the board has to set up internal
con1mittees corresponding to audit and remuneration committees

of listed corporations.

l'vToreover, the roles of

Chairman

and CEO

have to be split, and a lead non-executive director has to be
appointed, while top management compensettion is performance
related.
Whether political accountability

is a sufficient governance

mechanism to ensure that supervisory agencies' agents perform
their task well or whether governance mechanisms typical of
publicly traded corporations are useful complements for the same
purpose are questions that it is impossible to answer on a general
basis.

A well-functioning political arena can make the marginal

contribution of corporate governance mechetnisms in the absence of
market constraints absolutely trivial.
On the other hand, in countries where politicians have a strong
clout on formally independent regulators, governance mechanisms
granting voice to constituencies such as industry, practitioners and
consumer representatives can help avoid excessive regulation and
hyper-sensitivity

to

public

image

concerns,

at

least

in

circumstances not as extreme as the ones we have experienced in
the early Fall of
3.

2008.

REREGULATION: IS THERE A CHANCE TO AVOID THE USUAL
MISTAKES?

While taking measures to avoid the financial meltdown and to
smooth the effects of the crisis, policymakers around the globe are
already busy fixing what the crisis purportedly has shown to be

5

In the following no specific attention will be paid on political control

mechanisms. Suffice it to say here that the FSA is much more independent from

political bodies in making its budget decisions and in levying fees from market

participants than the U.S. SEC.

A form of accountability towards the market

exists, in the form of a prior consultation on the entity and distribution of fees
among the various n1arket participants.
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broken in (or shamefully absent from) financial markets 1aws.

lf

(among o thers) Enron and \NorldCom in lhe United States and
A hold

and

s ome th ing"

in

Parma tal

the

EU

p rompted

a

season of

"do

reforms, as Roberta R oma no has argued,{, a crisis of

such proportions vvill inevitably lead

(and in

fact is already

le a di ng) tu the san1c kind of regulatory clctivism.

ll is eC\sy to pre dic t that reregulali.on will lake

(at

least) four

forms. First, fincmcial institutions that arc currently unregulated or
very ligh t ly regulated (hke hedge funds or rJting agencies) will
b eco me more heavily regulated.
in lhe

Sarbanes-Oxley

JnteresLingly, just like

measures

Act, proposals for tighter reg Ltl a t j o n of little

re gu la l cd or unregulated players had c1lrcady been in place for a
while before the crisis erupted, showing once again that crises are
the most effective catalyst for increased regulation./

Second, the

most obvious lo opho les in financial regulation will be eliminated
(like the use of SIVs to lmvcr capita] adequacy requirements).
Third, an overall review of the ex isti ng rules will take place, as it is
already apparent with

regard to

the architecture of financia1

supervision in the United States and of the Bas el TI framework at
the international level.

Fourth, international coordination will

intensify much more than in the

2000s

ro u nd of post-sc a nd al

reforms, clue to the apparent global intercon.nectjon of the market
players at the center of the crisis, which will pos sibly lead to a
reduction in the scope of regulatory arbilrage and theref or e in
regulatory con1petition.
There

are a

number of problems with reregu lating (:fiJlancia 1)

tnarkets dur i ng, or in the aftermath ot
econom.ic) crisis.

a

severe financial (and

While such problems are well-known, it is

perhaps not totally pointless to list some of them here.

first of all, during or after a crisis, the costs stemming fron1 the
new regulatory framework are overlooked, while the benefits are
overestimated. :tvloreover, how can one overestimate the benefit of
any given rule ii its proponents can argue that it has the potentia]

to reduce, however little, the risk of another such crisis?
systemic risk:

how could one possibly oppose

Take

something as

" See Robe rta Romano, The Snrbnllcs-Oxley Act nud tfze Making of Quack
Co,-pomte Govemnnce, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525-26 (2005) (describing the "peculiar
disjuncture between the substantive corporate governance provisions of SOX and
the �ourcc of Enron's failure'').
7

/,f. al ]526 ("The failure of Enron, then, provided the occasion for

implementation of corporate governance initintives that were already in the policy

.c;oup. ") .
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intuitively good as a measure reducing systemic risk? Second, as
many have noticed, after a crisis regulators act like generals of on

army after losing a ,,var: they reorganize to vvin thc1t past war,
\v
· hich is a good recipe to be unprepared for the ne·d one.� Finally,
one problem with reregulation is that it is politically insensible for
policymakers to scrap previous rules tl1at have proven to be
ineffective, inefficient, or obsolete, even while they introduce new
rules that possibly tnckle the

problen1s as the old ones.

sc-nne

Unless the new rules are just tormal substitutes of the previous
rules, the latter will often stay despite their being (or having
tn facl, in dccid ing whether to repeal rules, a

become) pointless.

policymaker wm anlicipate the possibility that, in case of repeal,
after the next scandal or crisis someone might ex post argue that
those rules would have helped detect the scandal or prevent the
crisis,

casting

a

highly negative

light on thnl policymaker's

decision. Hence, there will be a strong bias in favor of preserving
all rules in place.
4.

''FACITE AMMUINA" AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION?

Borrowing Gerard Hertig's words, the conclusion to one of my
works published in this

Journal

was that, posl-Enron, in the area of

corporate law, the European Community should have had the
courage to do almost nothing.9 At the cost of sounding repetitive
(and

even

more

provocative),

argue

1

here

that

this

recommendation is m.ore generally valid in today's post-crisis
world. Of course, regulations like the capital adequacy framework
for banks -that have proved easily avoidable and/ or ineffective
and/or

lo

have

unintended

consequences-will

have

to

be

reshaped. But in many areas, the best course of action will be to
stay idle, not least for the very simple reason that 1narkets
themselves

are

already

self-correcting,

and

regulators

are

intensifying their action. Cultural change is already in place, as
press reports on banks' attitudes show a trend towards tougher
risk
8

management
See, e.g.,

JOHN

G.

and

better

FRANCIS,

policies

on

top

executive

THE POLITICS OF REGULAliON 182 (1993)

(comparing financial regulatory regimes to armies reorganizing to fight war they
have just lost and predicting" a loss of confidence in the regulatory structure'' as

the likely result).
9 St'e Luca Enriqucs & Matteo Gatti, Tin• Unensy Ca�c fur ToJ'-DOWII Corr1orntc
Law Hanilolliznlimt in the Europem1 Union, 27 U. PA .f.lNT'L ECON. L. 939,998 (2006)
(describing the context of Hertig's comment, and how il is very unrealistic to
expect nothing to be doM).
.
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comp ensation.111 Regulators' tendency to be tougher, e� ba ndo ni ng

previo us light-tCluch appro ac hes, is also e vid ent . 1 1

While theorelica11y defensibl e , the ide a of d oi ng al mo st nothi ng
Something \-dll h.:we to be

is, of course, a political non-starter.

done- or e�t lee1st ·will hnve to appct?r to be done.

Then,

"

viable,

second-best strategy (and possibly one governments are a dop t in g
alr eady ln somt> d eg ree, especially so long as they keep acting
p rimari ly nl the international le ,· el ) could be what in l cap ol itan

di.:1lccl is h.novvn

''fare ammuina:"

iiS

much like sailors of the

Kingdom of the Two Sicilics' Navy back itt the N ineteenl h century

did when the Highest Authorities of the K ingdom visited their
�hips/:!. regulators sho uld make a lot of noise Clnd show a lot of
activisrn, all the while producing very li ttl e change.

Of

course , it

would be ha rd to fool cognoscent i of financial markets re gul ati on

and practitioners, but the latter would not protest and lhe former
would have too little an au dienc e once the financial crisis is over.

A possible counterargument may be th a t if n othj ng "rec:.1!'' is
accomplished and instead r e gul a tio n is conducted in w h at is
known in Italian as the "gattopardesco" way,l1 then

a

time will

come when morkel p lo yer s (and once again cap tive regulators) will

have forgotte n p revi ous excesses and
excessive risk and

i n.fl a tin g

will

bubbles.

aga in

Be caus e

start taking

those

will

be

p rosp erous tin1es, policymakers will have absolutely no clout to
c u rb those excesses and to deflate those bubbles, much like tlley
111 Sec, c.�., Louise Story, 011 INn II Straet, a Bou us Senson of Uncertainty, ]NT' L
HERr\LD TRJB., Dec. 10, 2008, <1t n (describing how Wall Streel banks were to cut

annual bonuses); Kalrin Bennhold, Report Pi11poi11ts Fnulls al Societe Cent!ralt', INT'L

I IER�\LD TRI!�., May 24, :wos (reporting that SociQte Gent:!rale was pbnning to
cor·recl ils risk control s ystem after huge unexpected losses emerg<>d as a
consequence or il trt1der'c; fraud); KPMG, Lack of Stature and Resources for Risk

Managem�nt Cited .,� Leadinc; Contributors lo Cred it Crisis, KPMG Study Finds,
jan. 6, 2009, aPIIilnblt! at http:/ I W\-\'W.us.kpmg.com/RutUS_prod/ Documents/12
I Lack_of_Si<�lurt!.pdf (reporting results of a survey among banks' risk managers

according to

which 78

percent of the respondents declare their intention to

improve methodologies to m�asure and report r isks)

.

See, e.g., Alistair MacDonald, Brita111's FSA Begi11s lo Drop Its Light Touch,
WALL STREET j. (European Edition), Jan. 5, 2009, at 1, 28; Una Salgol & Brooke
Masters, FSA Code Will t\i111 to Tackle lncwtives for Risk-tnki11g, F!N. TIMES ( London),
Oct. 9, 2008, at 4 (f-SA has recently started requiring that bonus plans be linked to
1l

long-term results).
t:!

Sec Append b,,

n Gnttopordc;;co is defined

ilS a policy relative

Lon conserv<Hive poli cy based

on the belief thot the st<1lus quo can best be def�nded throt1gh reforms Lhat merely
change the surfaet' of thing�. See gmeral/y GUISEPPE 01 LAtvlrEDUSA, THE LEOPARD
(Archibald

Colquhoun trans.,
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did prior to the present crisis.
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Therefore, as the argument would

go, wt.:> should heavily reregulate now so

to have in place the

c1s

curbs that will be needed '"'·hen the current cultural change'�
effects

arc

ln other words, a cullure of frugality and risk

m·er.

control can beLl fad, vvhile rules arc here lo slay.
The problcn1 with this reasoning is, first that, as hinted before,
,

rules we devise now may not he the ones we will need to curb the
excesses pr ec eding and causing the next crisis.

Further, rule� are

not that s tic ky (they ar-e definite ly less sticky than hum< m greed).
Indeed, exce�sive reregulation

today

is

the best guar,lnteE:' of

effective pressure towards deregulation tomorrow.

APPEND!'\
Regolamento della Real Marina del Regno de l l e due Sicilie del1841

Art.27. "Facite Ammuina."
All' ordinc Facite Ammuina:
vann' a' poppa

e

tutti chilli che stanno a prora

chilli che stann' a poppa vann' a prora:

chilli che stann' a dritta vann' a sinistra

e

chilli che slanno

a

sinistra vann' a dritta: tut ti chjJJi che stanno abbascio vann'
ncoppa e chilli che stanno ncoppa vam1' bascio passann'
tutti p'o stesso pertuso: chi nun tiene nient' a ffa, s'aremeni
a 'cca e a 'lla."
Author's translation:
Regulation of the Royal Navy of the Ki n gdom of t he Two Sicilies
(1841)
Art. 27 ''Move n oisily around"
When ordered, move noisily around: all those standing in
prow shall move to the stern and all those standing astern
shall move

to the

prow;

all

those

standing

near

the

starboard shall move to the port and all those standing near
the port shall move to the starboard; all those standing at
the tree-top shall go down to the hold and all those
standing in the hold shall climb to the lree-top; everyone
shall pass through the same hatch.
Those who have nothing to do: do all you can hither and
thither!
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